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About this Book 
First published in 1992, J ht !:'1'otvingCrmstit11tim1 (Random House), the prcdeceN>rvolume to,/ Pmc-
tim/ Cm1tJMnirm to tfw Cowtitulion, covered the comtirntional cases in the United States Suprell\e Court 
through the 1991-1992 term. The original hardcover edition was supplemented in three volumes through 
the 199)-1996 term. 
Ca.,es from the rim:<.: supplements and the ( :ourt's later terms were incorporatnl in,-/ l'1;n/ic,z/ C{m;-
prmion to the Comtilution: f!rl//' the Sup/'C1111· Crmrl ff,H Ruled 011 lswts/im11 .-1/mrtion lo /.m1i11,( (Uni-
versity of California Press, 1999 ), which is current through the 1997-1998 term. 
Tl:n non-cumulative annual supplements, covering ten Court terms beginning with the 1998 'krm, 
Were published by Dialogue Press, and these were acecunmlated, rearranged, and edited for continuity 
(with minor errors corrected) in a single volume, '/he I )nmnial S11pplc111ml, in January, 2009. 1 he /)f·-
Ctnni,i/ S11pp/ei11mt covers in more than 200 topical essays the ·190 constitutional cases decided by 
the Snprell\e Court after the publication of the revised main volume, from Ocrober 1998 through 
June 20 o 8. 
'!his is the ninth supplement ofthe second (cumulative) series, covering the 008 constitution-
al and ljuasi-constitutional c1scs of the Court's terms, from the 2008-2009 term through the 
2016-2017 term, and noting the retirements of Associate Justices ])avid H. Souter and John P~1ul 
Stevens, the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, and the appoinrments of Associate Justices So11ia 
Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Neal ?vl. ( ;orsuch. For production reasons this year, decisiom of the 
Court during its 2016-2017 term arc discussed in a separate st:etion following the topical discus-
sion of cases decided from October 2008 throughJunc 2016. 
'I11a11ks to Katherine Georges for help with design and production and to Jo Shifrin frir assis-
tance on the Table of Ca;,es and Index. 
For further informatio11, contact me at jethro.lidx:rnian(~[>nyls.cdu. 
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Topics 2008-2016 
lhis section contt1ins all topics 11l'ising/im11 Ci/Sts r/ccirlu/ thro11,r;h the 2015-:w16 /a111. For topio 1iris-
inJ!../f"11111 c11s1'S decided durin,r; th!' .?.016-2017 tcrw, sa the sttlirm hrgiw1i11g alp. 20). 
ABORTION In 2016, in its first decision in 
nearly a quarter ccmury to confront the core of 
abortion rights, the Court held 5-0 in lYho/c 
TV1n111m'.1· 11mlth u. !Iclltnttrlt that Texas im-
posed unconstitutionally undue burdens on the 
exercise of the right to abortion when it sub-
jected abortion clinics and doctors to two regu-
lations that would have forced many clinic, 
throughout the state to close. 'lhe firs~ n::gula-
tion, the "admitting-privilcgc.s rcquin:rncnt," 
mandated physicians have admissions privileges 
at a hospital within ,o milts of any clinic in 
which he or she performs abortions. The sec-
ond, or "surgical-center n.:qu irement," d irened 
every abortion clinic to meet the minimum 
standards for ambubtory surgical centers. In a 
suit to enjoin enforcement of the admitting 
privileges requirement at two clinics and to bar 
enforcement of the surgical-center requirement 
statewide, a federal district court fimnd that the 
requirements, taken together, would lead to 
the closing of almost all abortion clinics in 
Texas." Among its findings: the number of clin-
ics, 40 before the Texas ]a,~' was enacted, dropped 
statewide by nearly half "in the wake ofenforce-
tnem of the admitting-privileges requirement." 
More would close should the surgical-center re-
quirement take effect, leaving the entire state 
With no more than eight clinics, and probably 
only seven. They would be located in only friur 
metropolitan areas-Houston, Austin, San 
Antonio, and Dallas-Fort Worth-and would 
leave "a particularly high barrier tCir poor, rural, 
or disadvamaged women"; more than two mil-
lion women ofreproducrivc age.: would live more 
than 50 miles from J clinic :rnd some ...,50,000 
would live more rlun 200 miles away. '!he in-
tended purpose of the regulations-to make 
women safrr-was a fiction: the data showed 
that the women had better mcdicd outcomes in 
the pre-cnactmcm clinics "than many common 
medical procedures not subject to such intense 
regulation," and, tellingly, ri6 of the++' licensed 
ambu larory smgical centers, bur nor abortion 
clinics, h,1d received waivers against .surgical-cen-
ter requirements. J\!loreover, the clinics' cost of 
compliance would be "signillcam," in the range 
of $1 million to $1.5 million each. 'lhe district 
court struck down the laws as creating a consti-
tutionally "impermissible obstacle" to obtain-
ing an abortion. '111C Fifi:h Circuit court of ap-
peals reversed, holding among other things that 
the two "lexas requirements "were rationally re-
lated to a legitimate srate interest": "rais[ing] the 
standard and quality ofcare for women seeking 
abortions and ... protect[ig] the health and wel-
fare of women seeking abortiom"; and that the 
district court irnpcrmissibly substituted its judg-
ment about the legislation's effects for that ofrhe 
Texas legislature. 
Speaking for the majority, Justice Stephen 
Breyer reversed. Under the principal precedent, 
PLnmcd P1l1'mthoorl o/So11thm.1tnn Pmmy/.l'd-
nitI u. Cm:y (1992), courts must consider both 
the benefits and burdens of the abortion law in 
question and must review under a much stricter 
standard than "rational basis": they must con-
sider whether a burden is "undue." Nor should 
courts defer to legislatures on the meaning and 
weight of the evidence. Judges must sifi: the evi-
6 ABORTION 
dcncc and weigh "the asserted benefits against 
the burdens." On inspection, <>aid Justice Breyer, 
the first requirement, admitting privikges, was 
said to benefit women by ensuring that they 
"have easy access to a hospital -;hould complica-
tions arise." Bm in fact "it brought about no 
such health-related benefit." Rather, "there was 
no significant health-related problem that the 
new law helped to cure." Studies showed that 
rhe complication rate in first-trimester abor-
tions is kss than one-quarter of one percent, 
and even these "rarely n::quire hospital admis-
-;ion, much less immediate transfer to a hospital 
from an outpatient clinic." Most abortion pa-
tients who develop complications do so days 
after surgery, not while they are in the clinic. 
"When asked directly at oral argument whether 
Texas knew of a single instance in which the 
new requirement would have helped even one 
woman obtain better treatment, Texas admit-
ted that there was no evidence in the record of 
such a case." Not only would the new require-
ment not help, it would place a "subsrantial ob-
stacle in the path ofa woman's choice." Half the 
'kxas facilities offering abortions closed in the 
months before the ad1nirting-privileges reqnire-
nH.:nt rook effect. Nineteen abortion di nics 
closed by the effective date of the regulation. 
Moreover, admitting privileges are not neces-
sarily (or not at all) based on skill of the doctor; 
"hospitals often condition admitting privileges 
on" the patients they bring in. Bur abortion 
physicians did nor bring in patients: in the pre-
vious decade in the El Paso area, for example, of 
the 17,000 abortions performed, not a single 
patient needed to be transferred to a hospital for 
emergency treatment. One doctor, who had de-
livered 15,000 babies over his 38-year career, 
"was unable to get admitting privileges at any of 
the seven hospitals within 30 miles of his clinic," 
for reasons having nothing to do with his com-
petence. As Justice Breyer summed up: "The ad-
mitting-privilege, requirement does not serve 
any relevant credentialing function." 
'I11e surgical-center requirement fared no bet-
ter. For one thing, requiring clinics and other 
facilities to "upgrade" ro various spatial, plumb-
ing, hearing, and mirsing standards would nor 
likely benefit patients because complications for 
most patients, such a'> those cm medications, 
come after rh<.:ir discharge from the facility. 'The 
evidence suggested "that abortions taking place 
in an abortion facility are safe-indeed, safer 
than numerous procedures that take place out-
side hospitals and to which Texas does not apply 
its surgical-center requirement." For example, 
"nationwide, childbirth is 14 rimes more likely 
than abortion to result in death, but 'frxas law 
allows a midwife to oversee child-birth in the 
patient's own home. Colonoscopy, a procedure 
that typically takes place outside a hospital (or 
surgical center) setting, has a mortality rate 10 
times higher than an abortion." Mor<.:over, the 
surgical-center requin:ment does not even apply 
to about two-thirds of rhe state's surgical cen-
ters: Texas waives the requirement for them bur 
not for any abortion facilities. Like its compan-
ion regulation, the surgical-center n:quirement 
would force more clinics to close." In the face of 
no threat to women's health, Texas sn:ks to force 
women to travel long distances to get abortions 
in crammed-to-capacity superfacilities. Patients 
seeking these services arc less likely to get the 
kind of individualized attention, serious con-
versation, and emotional support that doctors 
at less taxed facilities may have offered." 
In summary, the two 'Iexas reqtliremenrs were 
both constitutionally overinclusive and underin-
clusive: overinclusive because they would provide 
no additional health benefits while reducing the 
women's access to abortion facilities; underin-
clusive because they did nor apply to medical 
facilities and situations in which they might 
provide a benefit bur were imposed instead only 
on abortion facilities in which they were not 
needed. 1hc Conrt struck down both regula-
tions on their face. 
Texas argued that under the law's severability 
clause a court's invalidation of any one applica-
tion of the requirements ought not invalidate 
any other possible application, and hence the 
law itself bars a ruling that the law is facially in-
valid . .Justice Breyer rejected the argument; a 
severability clause so interpreted would force 
courts to perform legislative work, picking and 
choosing the rules that would apply to any par-
ticular conduct. Doing so "would inflict enor-
mous costs on both courts and litigants, who 
would be reqtlin:d to proceed in this manner 
whenever a single application of a law might be 
ADEQUATE STATE GROUNDS 
valid." If a law with such a severability clause 
s;ud (this is not Justice Breyer's exampk) "it 
shall be unlawful to act wrongfully," the Texas 
;:rgument would preclude striking it down as 
facially invalid and would require the courts, 
rnstead, to examine each use, rcv..:rsino a convic-
. . 0 
tion for singing too cheerfully on the sidewalk 
and upholding it (perhaps) when appli.:d to 
murder. The Court declined "Texas' invitation 
to pave the way for legislatures to immunize 
their statures from facial review." 
ABSTENTION DOCTRINE In Skinner I'. Swit-
zer, the Court denied a state's claim that the 
Rooker-fcl J 1 J. · l . . , u nan uoctnne 1ars a cnn11nal de-
fendant !'rom seeking access through a postcon-
VICtlon federal §198 i mit to DNA evidence in 
the hands of prosecutors or police. In earlier 
proceedings state courts turned down the dden-
dam's reqt1esr · · · I · -1 · - Ill postconvICtton appea s. I 1e 
state asserted that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
barred the " 8 . · I · · 
. . :119 ) smt xcause it was a way of ask-
lll" ·de de ., I d · · · o' ! ,\ istnct court to relirigate a question 
a~ready decided by the stare courts. 'Ihe Supreme 
Court disagreed. Rooker-Feldman "is confined 
to cases oft11e I" J f. I . I 1 I . 
· ~mu rom w 11c 1 t 1e L octnne ac-
quired its na . . .. . 1. I l 
· , me. c,1ses oroug 1t 1Y state-court 
losers · · · 1· . 
· - · · · mv1t1ng l 1srncr court review and rejec-
tion of lthe st·1t, . , ] . J ,, B I 
· , e courts JUugmcnrs. ur 11.:re 
the er· · . 1 J f" 1 L 
• · 
1111 111,l oe enuant asserts an independent 
federal cla' I 1 I , · 
'u11, name\', r 1at t 1e '>tares refusal to 
turn over th, , · J ' I · 1 • e ev10ence l cmes om: process. Ihc 
target in tl1 , . . . I " l I ] 
. . e Sll!t 1s not r 1e al verse state court 
decisions ti I . l [ h d -
- 1emse ves; ms teal , t e efendant] 
targets as u , . , 1 I ] 
. · ' - nconst1tur1ona t 1e [state srarntc that 
[the state courts] authoritatively construed .... A 
state-court d . . . bl b I 
, ens1on 1s not reviewa e y ower 
federal - - . b ·. 
. . couns, ut a statute or rule goverrnng the 
dcc1s1on m·'y be -l ll { . c { 1 . " 
. " c 1a engeL ma rel era action. 
, I11e Court unanimously rejected the claim in 
.\prmt Co~ · · . /. / 1 , l 
, nrnunm1t11ms v. 11mus t 1at a tn era! 
courr shoul { -I . · { · · . c a )stam lll1l er J mmger 1•. Jl11n1s 
from hea1.. · I , l 
. ' mg a rate case uwo vmg a ocal tclecom-
1nun1catio11 - -- -». I 1 . , s c,u11e1, w 1en t 1e same question was 
bemg •xe . l . , 
. .r senrec Ill a state proceed mg. Yrmn~ff re-
qmres ab- . · h ' 
· ' stent1on w en a parallel <;tare criminal 
caseis11end' ' 1 , 111 . ·1 
. . .r 1ng, w 1en a para e state c1v1 proceed-
ll1g ts akin t · · I 
_ · ' o a crumna prosecution, or when the 
stare 1)roce. 1· . 1· " , . . 
- cc mg unp 1cates a states interest m 
cnforcingtl1 · ·I'" 1 · l ,_ ,, c C'll us am Jlll gmerns ot its courts. 
Bnr in this case a local carrier sought to impose 
"intrastate access charges fiir tdcphone calls 
transported via the Internet" on a national carrier. 
None of the cirrnmstances of rhis case fir within 
the "exceptional circumstances" of Ymmga noted 
above. 'I hose three cirrnmsranu::s "define Yo11n,~c 
n-'s scope," the Court said. 
.\'('{' r1f.-r1: I>ISUJ/ Tiff IN C'R/,HIN.-11, i'l/IJCU f)JNUS. 
ADEQUATE STATE GROUNDS 
Pmet!!, the Court adhered to the presulllption 
it annmmced in 1\lirhigt111 1>. /,011L~ (198>) that 
when a state court decision "appears to rest pri-
marily on federal law, or to be interwoven with 
the federal law," unlcs-; it is "clear from the face 
of the opinion" tlut it rests on an adequate and 
independent stare ground, the Court will as-
sume that the state court decided as it did "be-
cause ir believed that federal law required it to 
do so." In raising the question of whether the Mi-
1m1d11 rules must be expressed in particular lan-
guage, the state supreme court "trained on what 
i\Jimnrlz demands, rather than on what [stare 1 
law indeprndenrly requires." Said Justice Rurh 
Bader Ginsburg, "We then:frire cannot identify, 
'from the face of the opinion,' a clear statement 
that the decision rested on a state ground separate 
from i\limnd.z." She noted rhar the state suprellle 
court remains fr..:e to impose "any ~1ddirional pro-
tections against coerced confessions it deem-; ap-
propriate" under the _-;tatc constitution, but be-
cause its decision did not indicate "clearlv and 
expressly" that it "was based on bona fide sq1a-
rate, adequate, and independent [state] grounds," 
the Court has jurisdiction to decide the question. 
[For details, see SELF-INCRIMINATION.] 
In Cone u. Rell, a murder defendant's third 
appeal to the Supreme Court (for the earlier 
cases, see Bell u. Cone (2.002) and (2.005)), the 
Court held that a defendant is nor procedurally 
barred from raising a federal claim in a frderal 
habeas appeal merely because a state court asserts 
that a procedural ruk: bars it from considering the 
claim. Federal courts may go behind the state's 
conclusion to determine whether the state's rdi-
ance on a procedural default rule is genuine. In this 
case, the state courts insisted that the ddendant 
had either twice presented (or, contradictorily, 
waived) a claim that he had been denied Rmtly 
material that might tend to exrnlpatc him. In fact, 
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